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Abstract
This paper analyses long-term fiscal sustainability with a model which incorporates
a number of feedback eﬀects. When fiscal policy responds to ensure long-term sustain-
ability, these feedback eﬀects can potentially modify the intended outcomes by either
enhancing or dampening the results of the policy interventions. The feedbacks include
the eﬀect on labour supply in response to changes in tax rates, changes in the country
risk premium in response to higher public debt ratios, and endogenous changes in the
rate of productivity growth and savings that respond to interest rates. A model of
government revenue, expenditure and public debt which incorporates these feedbacks
is used to simulate the outcome of a range of fiscal policy responses. In addition the
eﬀects of population ageing and productivity growth are explored.
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1 Introduction
The provision of long-term policy advice requires projections which describe the possible
paths of government debt and other related variables, under a clear set of assumptions.
Indeed in New Zealand, the Public Finance Act 1989 requires the Treasury to produce a
statement on the Crown’s long-term fiscal position at least every four years. These state-
ments are required to provide 40-year projections of the fiscal position. They identify
challenges that are likely to face future governments, such as those arising from population
ageing, and provide members of the public with information on evidence-based options for
meeting those challenges.
The New Zealand Treasury has presented three Long-term Fiscal Statements and in
successive reports improvements have been made to both the data and the methodology; see
Treasury (2006, 2009, 2013a). The projection method broadly follows the most widely-used
type of modelling: that is, it uses a ‘bottom up’ approach in which, from a given starting
point, appropriate growth rates are applied to a wide range of income and expenditure
categories. It uses an extensive database containing detailed population and labour force
projections and is referred to as the Long Term Fiscal Model (LTFM).1 Given a projected
divergence between aggregate government expenditure and revenue over time, implying
rising debt levels, the model can be used to consider the orders of magnitude of expenditure
reductions or tax revenue increases required to achieve a specified debt target.
The projections may be described as ‘mechanical’, in that neither the behavioural
responses of individuals nor the policy responses of governments are modelled. When review-
ing the 2013 Statement, Ter-Minassain (2014, p. 50) suggested that:
there are several aspects of the exercise that could be improved in future LTFSs,
and the Treasury should continue to refine its analytical tools to do so. First. . . the
non-behavioural, spreadsheet-based nature of the LTFM implies that projections
do not allow for feedbacks from the fiscal developments to the macro-economy.
. . . it would be desirable to present, in future versions of the LTFS, scenarios
with diﬀerent dynamic paths of the key macroeconomic assumptions, to allow
for plausible feedbacks from the growth of the debt.
1For details, see Bell and Rodway (2014). A similar approach is adopted by the Australian Treasury
(2015). Variants of this kind of procedure are also used to examine projected New Zealand social expendi-
tures only, although allowing for stochastic elements, by Creedy and Scobie (2005) and Creedy and Makale
(2014).
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The present paper therefore represents a first step in responding to this challenge. It
examines long-term fiscal sustainability in the context of a modified ‘bottom up’ model in
which a limited number of feedback eﬀects are introduced, while a mechanical approach
continues to be used for many components of the model. Policy responses to fiscal deficits,
along with other endogenous responses to debt levels, have feedback eﬀects. These may
enhance or modify the intended or initial consequences of those responses. For example,
tax and expenditure policy changes might be implemented to deal with a fiscal deficit. At
the same time, the interest rate may vary as a result of risk premium adjustments to debt
levels. This may in turn have further consequences for fiscal sustainability.
However, rather than attempting to capture all the details involved in many types of
expenditure and tax, the present paper uses a more aggregative approach than the Treasury’s
LTFM. It distinguishes only four types of expenditure in addition to debt servicing costs,
and has a very simple income tax structure together with a Goods and Services Tax (GST);
other forms of tax revenue are combined into a single component. The feedback eﬀects are
modelled using reduced-form specifications rather than a structural approach with explicit
optimising behaviour. The model nevertheless contains a suﬃcient amount of detail to
enable a range of policy responses to be examined. Furthermore, careful calibration of the
model produces a ‘benchmark’ projection of the ratio of government debt to income that
closely approximates that of the Treasury’s LTFM (2013c). The basic structure presented
here has also been influenced by the desire in future research to introduce uncertainty into
the model and to examine optimal policies to achieve sustainability, requiring a specified
evaluation function.
Faced with a set of revenue and expenditure projections implying an increase in debt
over a specified time period, a range of fiscal sustainability or solvency indicators can be
produced, based on manipulations of the government multi-period budget constraint. The
many issues involved in assessing sustainability and the required adjustments in the face of
projected debt growth are discussed by Buckle and Cruickshank (2014) in the New Zealand
context.2 Basic measures include the increase in the fiscal balance (the diﬀerence between
revenue and expenditure including debt interest charges) in each year, expressed as a pro-
portion of GDP, needed for the present value over an infinite horizon of surpluses to cover
2Early definitions and measures were proposed by Blanchard et al. (1990). For a non-technical discussion
of issues, see Schick (2005). The approach adopted by the European Union is set out in detail in European
Commission (2006). For an example of its use, see also Kleen and Pettersson (2012). A recent review of
approaches is by Pradelli (2012).
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the current debt. Alternatively, a less restrictive measure is the increase in the fiscal balance
(again as a proportion of GDP) needed to attain a specified debt target by the end of the
projection period. In European Commission (2006), the first measure is denoted S2 and the
second, involving a debt ratio of 60 per cent of GDP by 2050, is referred to as S1.3
These approaches are acknowledged to provide only an indication of the risk facing a
country, and do not pretend to oﬀer an optimal response. In addition, the measures ignore
the time path of debt, since they relate to a required constant (relative) increase in the fiscal
balance each period. The time profile may itself have consequences which raise important
policy concerns. Furthermore, no consideration is given to how attainable the alternative
objectives may be, and which policy instruments might be used. By contrast, the present
paper considers explicit policy variations needed to achieve a specified fiscal balance at the
end of the projection period.
The basic model is set out in Section 2. Feedback and other endogenous eﬀects are
added in Section 3. Benchmark calibration values are described in Section 4. Benchmark
projections are presented in Section 5, where it is shown that, in the absence of feedback
eﬀects, where expenditure items are assumed to grow at specified fixed rates and tax rates
are unchanged over time, the model can closely approximate the projections obtained by
the Treasury’s LTFM.
Having described the model, policy simulations are reported in Section 6. In the bench-
mark simulations, the main diﬀerence between the model with and without feedback eﬀects
arises as a result of the rising risk premium, and hence debt servicing costs, as the debt
ratio increases. However, unlike a number of other countries, the debt ratio in New Zealand
is not projected to increase to the levels that generate very large increases in the risk pre-
mium. Other feedbacks are largely absent because growth rates are held constant and there
are no tax policy changes. Of interest are cases where expenditure and tax policy changes
are imposed with particular objectives in mind. For example, if the income tax or indirect
tax rates are increased, or various expenditure growth rates are reduced in an attempt to
control the extent of the debt increase, other feedback eﬀects play a more significant role.
Conclusions are in Section 7.
3See Appendix B for further details of these measures.
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2 The Basic Model
This section provides a description of the main components of the model. As explained in
the introduction, the aim is to construct a model that is capable of projecting the paths of
government revenue and expenditure, and therefore debt, under a range of assumptions and
feedback eﬀects. To make the model as transparent as possible, a high level of aggregation
is used. It is clearly necessary to allow demographic variations in both population size
and its age composition to influence government expenditure and revenue. While detailed
demographic projections are used, distinctions are drawn only between those of working
age, retirement age and those below working age. To provide an easy reference to variables
in the model, Table 1 provides a list with brief definitions.
2.1 Government Expenditure and Debt
Given that a primary concern is with fiscal sustainability and with policies designed to
achieve sustainability, the evolution of government debt plays a crucial role in the model.
Let  denote debt at the end of time period, , for  = 1   , where 0 is the debt
inherited from the past and ∗ is the target debt level for the end of the planning period,
 . If  is the domestic interest rate at time , equivalent to the government bond rate, then
the debt servicing cost at time , denoted , is given by:4
 = −1 (1)
The interest rate depends on the world interest rate, , which is assumed to be constant,
and a risk premium, . Thus:
 = ( + )−1 (2)
In addition to debt servicing costs, government expenditure includes welfare spending,
, which consists of two components. There are transfer payments (welfare benefits) of
, received by non-pensioners, and aggregate superannuation benefits of  received
by pensioners.5 Hence:
 = + (3)
4This form is appropriate in the present discrete-time model. However, the NZ Treasury LTFM allows
for debt to build up steadily during each year.
5New Zealand Superannuation is taxable, as are most of the working-age transfer payments. This is
allowed for in the calibration of the model, discussed below, which uses net-of-tax values.
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Table 1: List of Variables
Symbol Definition
 Debt at time , for  = 1  
 Debt ratio: 
∗ Target debt level for time  Debt service charge at :  = 
 World interest rate
 Risk premium at 
 Domestic interest rate:  =  + 
 Untaxed welfare (benefit) payments at 
 ∗ Welfare payment per person Superannuation payments (net of tax) at 
 ∗ Superannuation payment (net of tax) per retired person Total welfare spending at :  = +
 Government spending on health and education at 
∗ Health and education spending per person Other government expenditure at 
∗ Other expenditure per person Aggregate non-welfare expenditure at :  =  +
 Total government expenditure at :  = + + 
˙ Change in productivity growth rate at  Base productivity growth rate Productivity growth rate at :  =  (1 + ˙) Potential income from labour and capital rental at 
 Ratio of income to potential income
 Income at :  = 
 Aggregate income at :  = + interest income
 Stock of accumulated savings at 
 Aggregate savings at 
 Propensity to save (from disposable income)
  Income tax rate at 
 Tax-exclusive GST rate at 
 ∗ Eﬀective tax rate at :  ∗ =   +  (1−)(1−)(1+) Indirect tax (GST) revenue at 
 Total tax revenue at 
 Other (non-tax) government revenue at 
∗ Other expenditure per capita at 
 Number of benefit recipients at 
 Number of superannuation recipients at 
 Number of workers at 
 Total population at 
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The levels per person are denoted  ∗ and  ∗, so that if  and  denote the
number in receipt of the pension and welfare benefits respectively,  =  ∗ and
 =  ∗.
All other spending at  is denoted by . This is composed of spending on publicly-
provided goods such as health and education, , and other expenditure, , which
includes, for example, core government services, law and order and defence: hence  =
+. The former may be considered as investment in human capital, while the other
expenditure has no direct impact on individuals. As explained below,  is assumed to
have no direct impact on the labour supply, and thus incomes, of individuals. While 
does not have a direct impact, it influences income via its eﬀect on productivity growth.
Variations in these spending categories are produced by variations in per capita amounts,
∗ and ∗ and variations in the total population, : hence  = 
¡∗ +∗¢.
Total government expenditure, , is thus:
 =  + + 
=  + + −1 (4)
Define  as total tax revenue from direct and indirect taxes: this is considered in more
detail below. The debt in  is thus given by:
 = −1 + − (5)
Substituting (4) into (5) gives:
 = (1 + )−1 + + − (6)
Continual substitution gives the long-term government budget constraint as:
 = 0
Y
=1
(1 + ) + ( + −) +
−1X
=1
"
( + −)
Y
=+1
(1 + )
#
(7)
The simpler form of this budget constraint, for the case where the rate of interest is constant,
is used in Appendix B to examine the annual increase in the fiscal balance,  − , as a
ratio of GDP, needed to achieve a target debt ratio by a given year.
2.2 Income Generation
For the calculation of tax revenues, it is necessary to obtain the time profile of aggregate
income, denoted  at time . This is the sum of incomes arising from labour and (capital)
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rental income, , and interest income from financial savings. The model makes no attempt
to treat the production side of the economy explicitly. The model thus contains no explicit
wage rate, nor does it deal with labour and capital inputs into production.6 A base level of
productivity is taken as exogenously given and, as explained below, productivity changes
can arise from growth in public expenditure on health and education per person, which is
considered to augment human capital.
First, define  as total ‘potential income’ in period . To allow for productivity growth
at the rate , write:
 = (1 + )−1 (8)
Let  indicate the ratio of actual to potential income, so that aggregate income can be
written as:
 =  (9)
Hence  captures all possible incentive eﬀects. The specification of  is described in the
following section.
Interest income then needs to be added. Assume that all forms of income are taxed at the
same rate. Then if  denotes aggregate financial savings at time, , as defined above, these
are all assumed to be invested at the going rate, . Letting financial capital be denoted ,
then:
 = −1 + −1 (10)
As this refers to the accumulation of financial savings, no depreciation is applied. As dis-
cussed above, the production side of the economy, including investment and capital accu-
mulation, is not modelled explicitly. Hence aggregate income is:
 =  + −1 (11)
For simplicity, this assumes that the borrowing and lending rates are equal, and the same
both for the government and individuals, and the return to investment is equal to the
domestic rate of interest.
The above specification can easily be augmented to allow for population growth. A
simple adjustment is made by raising  by a proportion that depends on the growth rate,
from period − 1 to , of the population above working age.
6The high level of aggregation also means that the model cannot deal with a changing composition of
output and any relative price changes which may result from population ageing and government policy.
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2.3 Tax Revenue
No attempt is made here to model the complexity of the tax and transfer system. Suppose
that income tax is simply a constant proportion,  , of taxable income. Income tax revenue
is thus easily obtained as  . Tax revenue is also obtained from indirect taxes. Define 
as indirect tax revenue at , from a GST/VAT type of system, where  is the tax-exclusive
rate applied to all expenditure. However, indirect taxes applied to  are ignored here since
these are netted out in the government’s budget constraint. The tax-inclusive indirect tax
rate is  (1 + ).
First, it is necessary to obtain expenditure, inclusive of indirect tax. Savings, , are
made from net income. Assume that all transfer payments, , are consumed. Then if
savings are a constant proportion, , of post-tax income:
 =  (1−  ) (12)
Indirect tax is thus:
 =
∙ (1− ) (1−  )
1 + 
¸
 +
∙ 
1 + 
¸
 (13)
Total tax revenue, , consists of income tax, plus , plus other revenue, . The latter is
specified as an amount per capita, ∗, which is subject to an exogenous growth rate, along
with growth arising from the increase each period in the population above working age. In
considering the second term in (13),  (1 + ), can be regarded as the tax-exclusive value
of expenditure, on which the tax-exclusive rate, , is levied.
Total revenue is thus:
 =   +  + (14)
Substituting for  from (13) gives total revenue as:
 =  ∗ +
∙ 
1 + 
¸
 + (15)
where  ∗ is the overall eﬀective proportional income tax rate, given by:
 ∗ =   +  (1− ) (1−  )(1 + ) (16)
The term, (1− ) (1−  )  (1 + ), reflects the tax-exclusive expenditure arising from an
extra dollar of gross income. This is subject to indirect tax at the tax-exclusive rate, .
Hence  ∗ reflects the combined eﬀect of the income and consumption tax rates.
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3 Feedback Eﬀects
This section describes feedback eﬀects involving the risk premium, savings, incentives and
productivity growth. In each case simple reduced-form specifications are adopted rather
than attempting to introduce microfoundations into the model. Given the absence of an
explicit production function, the wage rate is not endogenous and, with only aggregate
output modelled, there are no relative price eﬀects. The model does not have an explicit
role for the exchange rate (which also aﬀects relative prices), and its possible connections
with the debt ratio and the interest rate risk premium.7 In addition, there is no mechanism
for the real interest rate to influence investment and, via this eﬀect, the growth rate.8 Tax-
financed government expenditure has no direct stimulus eﬀect on the real economy except
that, as discussed below, the expenditure on health and education is treated as aﬀecting
human capital and thus productivity.
The model thus contains only a limited number of possible feedbacks, given the aim
of taking an initial step towards introducing endogeneities and linking policy responses
to particular policy instruments. Furthermore, the model provide the basis for possible
extensions, in particular the introduction of uncertainties and the investigation of optimal
policies.
3.1 The Risk Premium
Interest rates in New Zealand typically appear above those in comparator countries. This
diﬀerential is widely attributed to the presence of a risk premium. Foreign investors in
securities denominated in New Zealand dollars demand a margin above the world rate.
Burnside (2013) attributes this compensation to the possibility of a depreciation of the New
Zealand dollar following a rare and extreme event. The higher is the ratio of public debt to
GDP, the more vulnerable the New Zealand economy is to some unexpected event and the
greater the risk of a devaluation. Baldacci and Kumar (2010), using a panel of 31 countries
for the years 1980 to 2008, find that ‘higher fiscal deficits and public debt raise long-term
nominal bond yields in both advanced and emerging markets’ (2010, p. 13). They report
7One possible extension may be to distinguish between traded and non-traded goods, which have diﬀerent
capital intensities. Government expenditure may be considered to be mainly on non-traded goods. For a
model using this distinction, see Guest and Makin (2013).
8Furthermore, investment aﬀects capital intensity and thus wage rates, which in turn aﬀect labour supply.
This potential feedback is thus excluded from the present model.
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that typically ‘an increase in the debt ratio of 1 percentage point of GDP leads to an increase
in bond yields of around 5 basis points’. In an analysis of an extreme event, Gereben et al.
(2003, p. 3) estimate that an outbreak of foot and mouth disease could raise the net public
debt by approximately 10 percentage points after 5 years, with an associated ‘50 basis point
increase in the risk premium on New Zealand dollar assets, as a result of foreign investors
becoming more reluctant to invest in New Zealand in times of high uncertainty’.
A number of studies have made estimates for New Zealand. Hawkesby et al. (2000)
examine the interest rate diﬀerential between New Zealand and Australia and the United
States. They decompose the diﬀerentials into expected currency movements, default and liq-
uidity risks, and unexpected currency movements. They estimate that the 10 year currency
risk premium is between and 1 and 2 percentage points relative to the USA.
For the present model, it is assumed that the risk premium at time  is a function of
−1−1 = −1. Ostry et al. (2010) show how the cost of borrowing typically rises
with higher debt levels. However, their evidence suggest that the risk premium increases
only slowly for relatively small values of this ratio, but increases rapidly once it exceeds
about 1.5.9
A specification that can capture this kind of relationship is the following. For −1
above a threshold, ∗, the following quadratic applies:
 = 1 + 2−1 + 3 (−1)2 (17)
and for −1 ≤ ∗, the premium increases linearly:10
 = 1 + 2∗ + 3 (∗)2 − 0 (∗ −−1) (18)
The response to increasing debt ratios therefore produces a rise in the risk premium, which
has a further consequence for debt as a result of the higher interest cost involved in servicing
the debt. Hence this type of endogeneity has important consequences for the evolution of
debt. However, there are additional consequences as a result of the influence, directly and
indirectly, of changes in the interest rate.
9The response of the risk premium to debt ratios in New Zealand is also discussed by Fookes (2011, p.
11) in the context of a scenario analysis of shocks to New Zealand’s fiscal position.
10This specification is used to ensure that there is no discontinuity between the two segments.
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3.2 The Saving Rate
A further possibility is to suppose that the saving rate, , depends on the interest rate. In
principle this eﬀect is ambiguous, but in the simulations reported below it is assumed (in
the ‘benchmark case’) that the interest-elasticity of savings is small but positive. This is
reflected in a reduced-form relationship between  and , with   0. For simplicity,
suppose:
 = 11 + 12 (19)
where parameters, 11 and 12 are both positive. With a fixed world interest rate of  ,
the domestic rate, , varies according to the risk premium, , which depends on the debt
ratio, as discussed above. A higher debt ratio may also lead to a Ricardian adjustment in
the form of increased savings, if the higher debt were to create expectations of higher future
tax rates; but this is not modelled explicitly here.11
An increasing debt ratio therefore not only leads to a rise in the interest rate, which
increases debt repayment costs, but also to a direct eﬀect on the savings rate. The savings
rate enters into the determination of the eﬀective tax rate,  ∗ , as shown in (16). A higher
savings rate reduces the eﬀective tax rate, thereby reducing revenue in the relevant period.12
This revenue-reducing eﬀect therefore slightly reinforces the increase in debt over time.
3.3 Incentive Eﬀects
An indirect eﬀect of the endogeneity of the risk premium, which has the eﬀect of raising the
savings rate above what it would otherwise be, and hence reducing the eﬀective tax rate,
is that the tax rate influences taxable income as a result of incentive eﬀects. In view of
the need to consider responses to changes in government tax policy, designed to achieve a
desired debt target, it is therefore important to allow for incentive eﬀects.
Suppose the variable, , is a function of the tax rate, so that  =  ( ∗ ), with  ∗ 
0.13 As explained above, this function reflects the extent to which income deviates from
11For a review of Ricardian equivalence, see Seater (1993). Similarly, the model does not allow for a
possible eﬀect on savings of changes in government expenditure (particularly adjustments to the growth of
superannuation and other welfare spending per person).
12The future tax payments arising from any dissaving is ignored here. It is the aggregate saving rate
which varies over time, not the rate in a life-cycle framework.
13Kleen and Pettersson (2012) include labour supply eﬀects using an elasticity of the employment ratio
with respect to the tax rate. They also assume that productivity falls slightly as labour force participation
increases (on the argument that the new entrants to the labour force resulting from a tax cut are relatively
less productive).
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its potential. Suppose the elasticity of taxable income, defined with respect to the eﬀective
net-of-tax rate, 1−  ∗ , is constant. Then:
 ( ∗ ) = 8 (1−  ∗ )9 (20)
This is consistent with literature on the elasticity of taxable income, which combines a
range of adjustments in a reduced-form expression similar to (20). This assumes there are
no income eﬀects and the elasticity of  with respect to the net-of-tax rate, 1 −  ∗ , is
constant at 9.14
When the debt ratio is increasing, the endogeneity of both the risk premium and the
savings rate means that taxable income is somewhat higher than otherwise because the
eﬀective tax rate falls. There is thus a ‘tax rate’ eﬀect and two ‘tax base’ eﬀects, moving in
opposite directions: a higher debt ratio leads to a higher rate of interest, which raises the
savings rate, leading to a fall in the tax base (via the eﬀect on GST) but also a fall in the
eﬀective tax rate, leading to a rise in the tax base (via the eﬀect on work incentives).
3.4 Productivity
Investments in the quality of human capital through both health and education can enhance
productivity.15 Earle (2010, p. 1) argues that, for New Zealand, ‘there is evidence that
increases in tertiary education have contributed to productivity growth’. This is reinforced
by the work of Razzak and Timmins (2010) who found that university qualifications had
a positive eﬀect on average economy-wide productivity.16 Similarly, there is evidence that
health eﬀects productivity through various channels. Bloom et al. (2001) found that good
health has a positive, sizeable, and statistically significant eﬀect on economic growth. Bloom
and Canning (2003) treat health as part of human capital and assess its impact on economic
performance. In subsequent work, Bloom and Canning (2005) find that for developing
economies a one percentage point increase in adult survival rates increases labor productivity
by about 2.8 percent.
To capture these eﬀects in the present model, suppose that changes in the productivity
growth rate, , depends on previous growth of the per capita public expenditure component,
14For New Zealand estimates and further references to the literature, see Carey et al. (2015).
15The Treasury (2013b, p. 21) suggests that, ‘increasing levels of qualifications should have a positive
impact on labour market productivity’.
16In the US context, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) found improvements in the quality of labour accounted
for nearly 15 percent of labor productivity growth for the period 1959-98.
13
∗, since this includes education and health expenditure.17 The change in  depends on
the change  years previously, that is in ∗−. This is assumed to be subject to decreasing
returns. Hence if a dot above a variable indicates a proportionate change, with for example,
˙∗− =
¡∗− −∗−−1¢ ∗−−1, then:
˙ = 4
1 + 5˙
∗−
6
(21)
This logistic form captures decreasing returns, such that the change in productivity growth
is a decreasing function of the change in public expenditure.18 Hence, if  is a ‘base level’
of productivity change:
 =  (1 + ˙) (22)
If ∗ grows at a constant rate over time, so that ˙∗− is constant for all , productivity
growth remains constant. A response to the anticipated debt increase which involves cutting
the rate of growth of per capita expenditure on health and education therefore has the eﬀect
of slowing down the growth of incomes somewhat. Hence tax revenue would be lower than
without this feedback eﬀect.19
4 Calibration of the Model
The first step in using the model is to specify time profiles for the expenditure components,
 and  , along with starting values for the various revenue and debt variables. Despite
the ‘simplicity’ of the model, suitable orders of magnitude of many of the variables can be
obtained from National Income data and demographic projections. The data sources and
values are set out in detail in Appendix A. Parameter values used for the various functions
are listed in Table 2.
17In a wide-ranging review of possible productivity eﬀects of population ageing Guest (2014, p. 165)
concluded that it ‘could aﬀect productivity through a number of mechanisms. But the magnitude and
even direction of some of these eﬀects are unclear in theory and evidence’. Infrastructure spending, not
considered separately here, may also be growth enhancing.
18It may, in addition, be thought that productivity change may be influenced by changes in the interest
rate. However, this eﬀect is likely to come via possible higher investment resulting from reductions in the
interest rate. The elasticity of  with respect to  can be expressed as the product of the elasticity of  with
respect to investment, and the elasticity of investment with respect to the interest rate. The overall eﬀect
is likely to be very small, and is therefore ignored here.
19It is not necessary here to consider all determinants of productivity, only the potential influence of
relevant variables contained within the model. Other influences would included, for example, international
connectedness and knowledge-based capital. Since the production side is not modelled here, productivity
growth can be regarded as total factor productivity growth, or either labour or capital augmenting.
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Table 2: Benchmark Parameter Values
Risk premium: For −1−1  ∗,  = 1 + 2−1 + 3 (−1)2
For −1−1 ≤ ∗,  = 1 + 2∗ + 3 (∗)2 − 0 (∗ −−1)
0 0.026
1 -0.03
2 0.015
3 0.0015
∗ 1.0
Productivity growth changes: ˙ = 4
µ
1 + 5˙
∗−
6
¶
4 0.6
5 35
6 0.00005
 0.015 5
Incentive eﬀects of taxation:  ( ) = 8 (1−  ∗ )98 1.0
9 0.5
Saving rate:  = 11 + 12
11 0.03
12 0.0833
Figure 1 illustrates the implications for the risk premium of the benchmark calibration
values. An increasing debt ratio produces modest steady increases in the risk premium
until the debt ratio exceeds 100 per cent of GDP (since ∗ = 1). An increase in the
debt ratio of 100 percentage points from 50 to 150 per cent of GDP is associated with a
rise in the risk premium of 50 basis points: this is consistent with findings of Baldacci and
Kumar (2010). The eﬀect on productivity changes of increases in the growth of health and
education expenditure are shown by the sigmoid form taken by the logistic curve in Figure
2.
5 A Benchmark Simulation
This section reports ‘benchmark’ projections, where it is assumed that there are no changes
in tax rates and all expenditure categories (per capita) grow at constant rates over the
period, using the initial values and parameters described in the previous section. This is
the typical ‘no change’ assumption using in producing expenditure and debt projections.
Obviously, such projections of an unsustainable debt ratio path are not regarded in any
15
Figure 1: Risk Premium and Debt Ratio
Figure 2: Change in Productivity Growth
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sense as ‘forecasts’ but merely as indications of the need for some kind of adjustment.20
The results are shown in Figure 3. Here, the dashed line indicates the debt ratio in
each year on the assumption that there are no feedback or endogenous eﬀects. The figure
also shows the base projections obtained by the Treasury’s LTFM. The solid line shows the
projections allowing for the various feedbacks, implying slightly higher debt ratios in the
later years. Since the various tax and growth rates are held constant over the period, the
only relevant feedback eﬀect in this case arises from the small eﬀect on the risk premium
of the increasing debt ratio. This increase in the risk premium is, by assumption, quite
modest over the range of debt ratios generated by the projections. If the projection period
were extended, the debt ratio would clearly move into the range where a rapid rise in the
risk premium, and thus in debt service charges, is generated. Hence the diﬀerence between
the no feedback and feedback cases would be expected to be much larger.
Figure 3: Benchmark Debt Ratio Projections
These projections demonstrate an unsustainable situation were there to be no adjust-
ments to the fiscal balance via taxation or revenue changes. The following section considers
a number of policies designed to generate sustainable fiscal projections. However, it is first
useful to consider the separate contribution of population ageing to the debt ratio projec-
20Furthermore, there may be market adjustments (operating for example via wage and price eﬀects)
which modify the debt increase. In addition, the partial approach used does not allow for the potential
adjustments arising from associated current account problems and exchange rate movements.
17
Figure 4: Debt Ratio Profiles with and without Population Ageing
tions, given much of the focus of the public debate on the demographic transition. Figure
4 compares the benchmark debt ratio projections and those obtained under the assump-
tion that the population age structure remains fixed at the 2014 values, while still allowing
the total population to grow at the same rate as in the benchmark projections. Clearly
the lack of long term sustainability arises primarily from demographic changes rather than
fundamental problems with tax and expenditure design settings.
The limited feedback eﬀects modelled here clearly do not lead to adjustments which
could modify the population ageing eﬀects. With an assumption (common to all projection
models) of constant growth rates of expenditure, there is a consequent constant growth rate
of income: higher growth via productivity gains requires a change in the growth rate of
health and education expenditure. This is modified only slightly towards the end of the
projection period when the extra savings, stimulated by the higher interest rate, slightly
reduces the eﬀective tax rate and thus stimulates labour supply. But this is not suﬃcient to
counteract the eﬀect of a higher interest rate on debt servicing costs. The question arises of
whether other market responses could modify the debt increase; as mentioned above, these
might include general equilibrium eﬀects on wage rates, the exchange rate and relative
prices.21
Furthermore, the various policy instruments modelled here, such as expenditure growth
21For an extensive discussion, which cautions against an excessive concern for population ageing, see
Disney (1996).
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rates and tax rates, cannot provide an endogenous stimulus to the economy, with the excep-
tion of a small boost to productivity generated by an increase in the growth of health and
education expenditure (which is insuﬃcient for it to be self-financing). As explained ear-
lier, the aim here is to take a small step to endogenise a limited number of responses to
policy changes designed to achieve fiscal sustainability. These are examined in the following
section.
6 Policies to Achieve Fiscal Sustainability
As indicated above, there is a potentially wide array of indicators of fiscal sustainability. The
European Commission (2006 and 2012) has developed and applied a number of indicators,
including S1 and S2, defined as follows:
S1 measures the constant annual improvement (measured as a proportion of
GDP in each period) needed in the fiscal balance in order to achieve a given debt
target within a specified time period. This represents ‘medium-term’ challenges.
S2 measures the constant annual improvement (measured as a proportion of
GDP in each period) needed in the fiscal balance in order to satisfy the inter-
temporal budget constraint over an infinite horizon. Where projections (assum-
ing no policy changes) are made over a finite ‘medium term’, the debt ratio in
subsequent years is assumed to remain constant at its value in the final projec-
tion year.
The derivation of these indicators is set out in Appendix B, where equation (B.14)
corresponds to S1 and (B.9) to S2. A property of both sustainability measures is that they
ignore the question of whether debt is increasing or decreasing at the end of the projection
period.
Estimates of both indicators were made for New Zealand, based on the benchmark case of
the previous section. In the case of S1, the annual improvement needed in the fiscal balance
each year was computed over a 40 year horizon in order to reach a given terminal debt
ratio. For terminal debt ratios of 20, 45 and 60 per cent, the required annual improvements
in the fiscal balance (as a percentage of GDP) are found to be 3.6, 3.3 and 3.1 per cent
respectively. Hence, only a modest additional adjustment to the fiscal balance is needed to
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achieve a terminal debt of 20 compared to one of 60 per cent. In the case of the infinite
horizon (S2 ), the annual improvement in the fiscal balance would need to be 6.2 per cent.
While these indicators are useful in providing a quantitative measure of the extent to
which fiscal policy would need to be adjusted, they have a number of limitations. First, they
are not realistic, in the sense that a constant increase in the fiscal balance is not a feasible
approach to fiscal management. Governments typically vary tax and expenditure policies in
accord with social needs and constraints imposed by prevailing economic conditions. Second,
the measures make no reference to actual policy instruments. Third, it is important to know
the impact of diﬀerent policy choices on the time paths of key macroeconomic variables.
The following sections therefore report the results of a series of simulations for a range of
policies. In each case, there is no attempt to specify a precise time path of the debt ratio.
Rather, a terminal debt target of 20 per cent is imposed, and the resulting path observed.
As the model does not lend itself to finding an analytical solution, the critical values for a
particular policy are found by iterating until the 20 per cent debt target is reached.
In examining alternative policies here, no attempt is made to produce any concept of
an optimal policy response. This would require the specification of a social welfare, or
evaluation, function expressed in terms of a range of performance measures.
6.1 Productivity
An improvement in the underlying growth rate of productivity would obviously lead to
higher rates of economic growth, increased tax revenues and potentially an improved long-
term fiscal outlook. It is therefore of interest to examine by how much the annual rate of
productivity growth would need to increase in order to meet a debt target of 20 per cent
in 2053, that is after 40 years?22 The eﬀect of a higher growth rate is shown in Figure 5
by the time path labelled ‘higher productivity’. To achieve this the growth rate,  would
need to rise immediately from its base level of 1.5 per cent to 1.85 per cent annually and
remain sustained at this rate over the projection horizon. The debt ratio would remain
below its initial level throughout but, as the debt ratio rises toward the end of the period,
a higher rate may be need for longer-term sustainability beyond the projection horizon. In
22Wilkinson and Acharya (2014), using the Treasury’s Long-term Fiscal Model (2013c), estimated that if
the base rate of annual productivity growth of 1.5 per cent could be raised to 1.94 per cent, a debt target of
20 per cent could be reach by 2022 and maintained at that level, without any reduction in real per capita
aggregate spending. However, their experiment did not use the ‘benchmark’, or expanding debt, projection
but the ‘Sustainable Debt’ scenario of the LTFM.
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the absence of feedbacks the required rate would be marginally higher at 1.88 per cent.23
It remains a moot point as to whether these productivity increases are feasible, as they lie
outside the range of historical experience.
Figure 5: Debt Ratio Profiles with Higher Productivity and Reduced Expenditure Growth
Rates
It is unrealistic to expect that productivity growth could achieve an immediate increase
and be sustained indefinitely. There are many policies that aﬀect this rate and it would
take time for any changes to flow through to higher rates. An alternative case was therefore
analysed in which the growth rate would, starting from the benchmark value of 1.5 per cent,
increase at a slow but constant rate of 0.000297 each year. This would achieve the terminal
debt target of 20 per cent, as shown in Figure 5. However after an initial decline in the
debt ratio, it would rise above its starting value before falling to meet the terminal target.
Furthermore, instead of a rate of improvement in productivity of 1.88 per cent annually (as
in case of a constant level discussed above), the terminal rate would now need to reach 2.65
per cent.
As mentioned above, policies can influence the growth of productivity. Improvements
in the quality of human capital through health and education spending provide a further
23Treasury (2013a, p. 16) takes a less benign view about the eﬀects of an increase in productivity, on
the argument that there would be pressures for higher spending, arising for example from the link between
NZS and wage growth.
21
channel through which productivity can be enhanced, as modelled in equation (21). The
question therefore arises as to whether there could be a long-term social dividend from
raising spending on health and education, such that a sustainable rise in productivity growth
is achieved. To explore this eﬀect further it was assumed that in the first instance per capita
expenditure growth would continue at its historical rate of 2 per cent annually. This would
raise the rate of growth of labour productivity from its base rate of 1.5 per cent to 1.53 per
cent, corresponding to a 2 per cent increase. Were the investment to increase from 2 per
cent to 3 per cent the net eﬀect would be to raise labour productivity to just 1.533 per cent.
It is apparent that even with unrealistically high rates of growth of spending on health
and education, the impact on productivity growth would be minimal. At the same time the
debt ratio would rise as a result of greater public expenditure. This result should not be
interpreted as denying the possibility of a return to social investment. Eﬀective investments
targeted at specific population groups at risk may well improve their lifetime outcomes
and individual productivity in a way that would generate a positive social rate of return.
But in using a highly aggregated model, it has not been possible to generate such results.
Furthermore, much of this spending is actually annual maintenance (for example educating
each new cohort of school entrants) and public spending is only a part of the total investment
that individuals make in their own health and education.
6.2 Expenditure Policies
Reduced public expenditure is one approach to achieve fiscal sustainability. To attain a
terminal debt target of 20 per cent the per capita growth rates of all categories of government
spending in this model would need to be reduced equi-proportionately by 21 per cent. This
would imply the growth rates of health and education spending be reduced from their
historical level of 2.1 to 1.6 per cent, and NZS rates from 1.3 to 1.0 per cent. The path
of the debt ratio towards it target level is shown in Figure 5. However the absolute real
levels of these expenditures would still continue to increase over time, as shown in Figure
6, which illustrates the expenditure tracks with and without the reduction in per capita
growth rates.
One suggested response to population ageing in New Zealand is to increase the age of
eligibility for NZ Superannuation. The growth rate of total expenditure on Superannuation
is equal to the sum of the growth rate of the payment per eligible person and the growth
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Figure 6: Expenditure Growth Paths
rate of the eligible population group. Such a policy change therefore operates via the latter
growth rate. Total expenditure growth on superannuation would therefore be expected,
depending on the precise response of labour force participation, to fall initially and then
increase towards its former level, though total NZS expenditure in absolute terms would
remain lower than otherwise. However, it has to be remembered that other forms of welfare
spending would rise as the growth of the working population rises. This type of policy
change could be examined using the present model.
6.3 Taxation Policies
This section reports on the implications of a range of options for changes to taxation. They
are summarised in Table 3 and the debt tracks are illustrated in Figure 7. In each case
the policy is analysed holding all other tax and expenditure policies at their benchmark
levels. For example, in the tax smoothing case, the value of  needs to be increased from
the benchmark of 16.25 per cent to 18.5 in each year, when allowance is made for feedback
eﬀects, which are here dominated by the adverse incentive eﬀects of taxation. Not allowing
for the feedbacks would suggest a lower increase to 18.0 per cent each year. Delayed tax
smoothing produces less variation in the debt ratio over the projection period. Indeed,
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with an immediate increase in the tax rate, there are surpluses over a period of around 20
years. Furthermore, at the end of the projection period, the debt ratio continues to increase
relatively sharply, suggesting that additional adjustments to the tax rate will be needed.
The fact that tax smoothing produces a period during which there is a surplus gives rise
in practice to the temptation to spend part of the surplus. That is, the tax policy produces
a possible endogenous expenditure change which governments often find diﬃcult to resist.24
This is of course just one consideration in evaluating alternative policies and, in particular,
inter-generational comparisons are relevant. However, these aspects cannot be considered
here.
If, instead of smoothing, the percentage tax rate were to be increased by 0.14 each period
(so that it becomes 21.9 per cent in 2053), the target debt ratio can be achieved. In the case
of delayed tax smoothing and delayed annual increase, the benchmark income tax rate is
held constant for the first ten year of the projection period. The variation in the debt ratio
over the projection period is lowest in the case where the tax rate is gradually increased
from the beginning of the period.
For the case where the gradual tax increase is delayed until a debt threshold of 35 per
cent of GDP is reached, this implies that the first change in the tax takes place in the year
2034. Not surprisingly, the annual increase and the final tax rate needed to achieve the 20
per cent debt target in 2053 is much higher than when action is taken earlier. In addition,
it implies higher intermediate debt ratios. The fact that tax rates are ultimately higher also
means that the adverse incentive eﬀects are greater. This means that the diﬀerence between
the required tax adjustment with no-feedbacks and those allowing for feedback eﬀects is also
much higher: the rates diﬀer by four percentage points in 2053.
Consider further the profile of the debt ratio in the case where the gradual increase in
the income tax rate is delayed until 2034. The projections show that a steady increase in the
tax rate can achieve a 20 per cent debt ratio by 2053, the end of the period. However, the
debt ratio continues to increase until around 2043 so that, without longer-term projections,
it may be thought during this period that the tax rate should be increased even faster — it
would not be evident that the profile will turn down towards the end of the period.
The profiles in Figure 7 allow for the various feedback eﬀects, the most important of
24Davis and Fabling (2002) model ‘expenditure creep’ and report that it can completely erode the eﬃciency
gains from tax smoothing. They conclude that, ‘strong fiscal institutions are a prerequisite for achieving
the welfare gains from tax smoothing’ (2002, p. 16).
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Table 3: Changes in Tax Rates Needed to Achieve Debt Target in Final Projection Year
Benchmark Rate for 20 per cent debt ratio in 2053
Policy (per cent) With feedback Without feedback
Income tax smoothing 16.25 18.55 per cent 18.0 per cent
Delayed tax smoothing 16.25 20.0 per cent 19.15 per cent
Annual tax increase 16.25 +0.14 per year +0.11 per year
(21.9 in 2053) (21.5 in 2053)
Delayed tax increase 16.25 +0.29 per year +0.22 per year
(27.8 in 2053) (25.1 in 2053)
Delayed tax increase 16.25 +0.75 per year +0.55 per year
with debt threshold (31.25 in 2053) (27.25 in 2053)
GST 15.0 18.0 17.4
Figure 7: Debt Ratio Profiles for Alternative Tax Strategies to Achieve Ratio of 20 Per Cent
by 2053
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which concerns adverse incentive eﬀects of taxation. The tax policies all ensure that the
debt ratio, despite variation over the period, remains within a reasonable range of the
target value. This means that the risk premium remains relatively steady. In the absence of
feedback eﬀects, the main implication is that both the income tax rates and, where relevant,
their annual increases are lower, as indicated in Table 3. However, the fact that the resulting
debt ratio profiles intersect at the start and end dates means that the ratios for intermediate
years, when allowing and not allowing for feedbacks, do not deviate significantly from each
other.
However, this should not lead to the conclusion that feedbacks have a minor influence.
If the economy is allowed to get into very high debt ranges, then considering tax and
expenditure policy changes that do not allow for feedbacks will give much too optimistic a
view of what is needed. If, from a high debt position, a policy change does not prevent the
economy from moving into the range where the risk premium rises sharply, severe problems
can arise from the high debt servicing costs. This interest rate problem is exacerbated by
large changes in taxation, which give rise to strong adverse incentive eﬀects. It is very hard
to reverse severe problems — perhaps leading to default. But the no-feedback case allows the
economy to move through periods of very high debt ratios and reduce debt with suﬃciently
large tax increases. It appears, incorrectly if the feedbacks are ignored, that a large degree
of inter-generational redistribution is able to get the economy out of trouble.
7 Conclusions
Ageing populations are leading to long-term pressures on government budgets in many
countries; New Zealand is no exception. In the medium term the challenge has become even
more marked as countries recover from the global financial crisis and endeavour to restore
their fiscal balances and reduce public debt levels. This paper develops long-term projections
as the starting point for analysing options to achieve long term fiscal sustainability.
A principal focus of the paper has been on incorporating some selected economic feed-
backs into a demographically driven model of government revenues, expenditure and debt.
For example rising debt levels could be expected to influence interest rates paid to foreign
holders of New Zealand dollar denominated securities. Furthermore, higher tax rates could
have disincentive eﬀects. When fiscal policy responds to ensure long-term sustainability
these feedbacks can potentially modify the intended outcomes by enhancing or dampening
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the eﬀect of the policy interventions.
A small model is developed that captures, at a high level of aggregation, the evolution of
public expenditure, tax revenue and public debt levels. It is used to project the key outputs
over a 40 year period. In the first instance the model, excluding any feedback eﬀects, is
calibrated and shown to track the long-term debt path of the highly detailed Long-term
Fiscal Model used by the Treasury. Following the incorporation of a small number of
feedbacks, the model is used to test the eﬀect of policy changes with a view to achieving a
net debt target of 20 per cent of GDP after 40 years. It is shown, for example, that in the
case of tax changes, the presence of the feedback eﬀects implies that a greater increase in
income tax rates would be needed to achieve the same debt outcome than in their absence.
It should be stressed that the achievement of a specified debt ratio target by the end of
the projection period is rather arbitrary and is used purely to illustrate the diﬀerent debt
paths taken as a result of diﬀerent policies. In particular, the diﬀerent policies were seen
to imply very diﬀerent debt profiles at the final projection year, with some (such as tax
smoothing) imply a large rate of increase while others (such as a delayed tax increase after
a threshold debt ratio is reached) implying a rapid decrease in year 40, and others (such as
a gradual tax increase) involving a much smaller rate of change.
A potentially significant avenue for achieving fiscal sustainability is raising the average
annual rate of productivity growth. However, the paper does not suggest how this might be
achieved: there is no suggestion that this would be easy and it may involve other spending
decisions. The model is used to demonstrate the critical importance of population ageing
for fiscal sustainability. If the total size of the population were to grow at the projected rate
but the age composition were to remain unchanged, fiscal sustainability would be assured
without further policy responses. Reducing the rate of growth in public expenditures could
lead to a sustainable fiscal position even though total absolute expenditure would continue
to grow in real terms.
The present model assumes that the relevant variables are known with certainty. Fur-
thermore, in examining alternative policies to achieve a desired debt ratio, no consideration
has been given to any concept of an optimal policy response. Nevertheless the model pro-
vides a strong foundation for further extensions. In particular, incorporating uncertainty
will provide a richer set of results and allow estimates of the probability that a given debt
target would be reached in any given year. In addition, the model can be used, by intro-
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ducing a social welfare, or evaluation, function, to examine ‘optimal’ government policy.
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Appendix A: Further Details of Model Calibration
This appendix provides details of the benchmark calibration values and data sources. These
are summarised in Tables 4 to 9. Data for Table 6 are drawn from: http://www.treasury.
govt.nz/government/financialstatements/yearend/jun14/27.htm. Data for Table 8
are derived from LTFS13: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/government/longterm/fiscalmodel.
Data for Table 9 are derived from LTFS13: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/government/
longterm/fiscalmodel.
Table 4: Income, Debt and Saving ($bn)
Name Symbol Value Source and Notes
Aggregate income (GDP) 0 230.0 Nominal GDP: http:
//www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/data
Income excluding interest
income
0 227.8 Computed from eqn. (9)
Ratio of actual to potential
income
0 0.92 Computed from eqn. (20)
Potential income 0 248.2 Computed from eqn. (8)
Net Core Crown Debt 0 59.9 As at 30 June 2014
http://www.treasury.
govt.nz/government/
financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (Table
9)
Debt service charge 0 2.7 Computed from eqn. (1)
Net household financial
wealth
0 50.0 As at 31 December 2013
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/
statistics/tables/c18/
Saving 0 6.0 Total domestic net saving
less general government sav-
ing National Accounts Year
ended March 2014 http://www.
stats.govt.nz/browse_for_
stats/economic_indicators/
NationalAccounts/
NationalAccountsIncomeExpenditure_
HOTPYeMar14.aspx
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Table 5: Public Expenditure ($bn)
Name Symbol Value Source and Notes
New Zealand Superannuation
(gross)
NZS(g) 10.9 http://www.treasury.govt.
nz/government/assets/nzsf/
contributionratemodel
New Zealand Superannuation:
(net)
NZS (n) 9.3 http://www.treasury.govt.
nz/government/assets/nzsf/
contributionratemodel
KiwiSaver subsidies KS 0.9 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (Note 6, p.54)
Note 6, p.54
Total social assistance grants SAG 21.9 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (Note 6, p.54)
GSF Pension expenses GSF 0.3 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (p.29)
Superannuation payments 0 9.6 NZS (n)+ GSF
Total benefits payments 0 11.9 SAG-NZS(g)+KS
Total welfare and social spending 0 21.5  + 
Oﬃcial development assistance ODA 0.5 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (Note 6, p.54)
Social investment spending 0 27.2 Health+Education spending
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (p.29)
Other public expenditure (nie) 0 17.0 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/
government/financialstatements/
yearend/jun14/93.htm (p.29)
Expenditure 0 0 + 0
Total government expenditure 0 67.9 Computed from eqn. (4)
Superannuation per person  00 $14,6380/ 
Benefit payments per person  00 $4.036 0/ 
Social investment spending per
person
00 $6,042 0/ 
Other expenditure (nie) per per-
son
00 $3,767 0/ 
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Table 6: Public Revenue ($bn)
Name Symbol Value Source and Notes
Note 2, p.51
Income tax revenue IT 27.8
Tax from NZS NZST 1.6
Income tax revenue (net of
NZS)
IT(n) 26.3
Corporate CT 9.3
Resident with-holding tax:
interest
RWT(i) 1.6
Resident with-holding tax:
dividends
RWT(d) 0.5
Total direct tax revenue TDT 37.6 IT(n)+CT+RWT(i)+RWT(d)
GST Revenue 0 16.0
Other indirect (roads,
excise, etc)
OIT 5.6
Other revenue OR 5.5
Total other revenue TOR 11.1
Total Sovereign Revenue 0 64.8 TDT+ 0 +TOR
Table 7: Saving and debt ratios
Name Symbol Value Source and Notes
Saving rate 0 0.03 Computed from eqn. (12)
Debt ratio 00 0.26 0/ 0
Net debt ratio 0 0.23 (0 − 0)/ 0
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Table 8: Growth Rates: Revenue and Expenditure per capita
Name Symbol Value Source and Notes
Growth rate of total other
revenue (TOR) per capita
 0.015
Total superannuation pay-
ments
 0.0124 In each case, the annual
average growth rates for
2013-14 to 2053-54 were
computed from the series
in the Long term Fis-
cal Model 2013 (In real
terms) adjusted for popula-
tion growth rates.
Total benefits payments  0.0120
Social investment spending  0.0205
Other public expenditure
(nie)
 0.0015
Table 9: Population: Numbers and annual average growth rates
Name Symbol Value Source and Notes
Number aged 0-14  892,890
Number aged 15-64  2,951,760
Number aged 65 and over  656,850
Total number  4,501,500
Growth rate aged 0-14  0.00168All annual average growth
rates calculated on the pop-
ulation projections for 2013-
14 to 2053-54
Growth rate aged 15-64  0.00406
Growth rate aged 65 and
over
gs 0.01929
Total growth rate  0.00651
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Appendix B: Solvency and Sustainability Indices
This appendix examines alternative indices which may be used to describe fiscal sustain-
ability, given a projected profile of government debt over a finite period. Given projected
revenues and expenditures over a specified period, which typically implying increasing debt
as a ratio of GDP, along with an initial level of debt, the problem is to obtain a measure
that indicates the extent of any adjustment required to achieve a given definition of sustain-
ability. Alternative definitions are clearly available, but this appendix considers one that
requires complete elimination of debt over an extremely long period, and an alternative
which requires the debt ratio to be reduced to a specified target by the end of a finite time
period.
First, suppose the real interest rate is constant at . As above,  and  denote govern-
ment revenue and expenditure in period . The long-run government constraint requiring
solvency is:
0 −
∞X
=1
( −)
µ
1
1 + 
¶
= 0 (B.1)
where 0 is the initial debt and all magnitudes are in real terms. This requires the present
value of expected future ‘fiscal balances’,  −, to be equal to the initial debt.
As above, letting 0 denote initial GDP, and noting that for constant growth at the
rate, ,  = (1 + ) 0, the above condition can be converted to ratios of GDP by
dividing throughout by 0 to give:
0
0 −
∞X
=1
( −)

µ
1 + 
1 + 
¶
= 0 (B.2)
Define the discount rate, 0, such that 1+0 = (1 + )  (1 + ), so that loosely speaking (by
neglecting cross product terms) 0 is the diﬀerence between the interest rate and the growth
rate of GDP.25
In the context of the model presented here, the various endogenous eﬀects imply that the
growth rate and rate of interest are not constant. But for present purposes it is a reasonable
approximation. Define the initial debt ratio, 00 = 00, and the fiscal balance, as a
ratio of income at time , as  = ( −) , so that the solvency condition (B.2)
25In fact, the sustainability condition could initially be expressed in nominal terms, and then all terms
converted to real terms, with an appropriate definition of  in terms of the nominal rate and the inflation
rate.
33
becomes:
00 −
∞X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
 = 0 (B.3)
This strong condition does not of course generally hold. Hence, where increasing debt
ratios are expected (the typical case when considering projections for which policy variables
are held constant), long term solvency requires a substantial improvement in revenue or
a reduction in expenditure (compared with the ‘business as usual’ basis of projections).
Given the time profiles of 0 and , along with initial values, the sustainability index, ∗,
is defined as the permanent improvement in the annual fiscal balance (as a share of GDP)
which ensures that the solvency condition is satisfied. Hence ∗ is implicitly defined by:
00 −
∞X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
( +∗) = 0 (B.4)
Using
P∞
=1
¡
1
1+0
¢
= 10 , this can be solved to give:
∗ = 0
(
00 −
∞X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶

)
(B.5)
This corresponds to the European Commission (2006) measure, 2. Calculation of (B.5)
is complicated by the fact that it requires projections of  over a very long period (until
discounting means that any additional years add a negligible amount to ∗). For this reason
the European Commission (2006) uses a simple decomposition of the index, based on the
strong assumption that that beyond the end of the projection period, at  , the fiscal balance
remains constant. First, define ∆ =  −0 as the diﬀerence between period ’s balance
and that of the initial period. Then (B.4) can be rewritten as:
00 − (0 +∗)
∞X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
−
∞X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
∆ = 0 (B.6)
Solving for ∗ gives:
∗ = 000 −0 − 0
∞X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
∆ (B.7)
Using the assumption that for    , ∆ = ∆ , (B.7) becomes:
∗ = (000 −0)− 0
X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
∆ − 0∆
∞X
=+1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
(B.8)
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and since
P∞
=+1
¡
1
1+0
¢
= 10
¡
1
1+0
¢
, this is:
∗ = (000 −0)− 0
X
=1
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
∆ −∆
µ
1
1 + 0
¶
(B.9)
Hence, ∗ can be expressed as the sum of three components:
∗ = ∗0 −∗1 −∗2 (B.10)
By comparison with (B.9), the terms in (B.10) are:∗0 = 000−0, ∗1 = 0P=1 ¡ 11+0 ¢∆
and ∗2 = ∆
¡
1
1+0
¢
.
The above condition is extremely strong. It requires complete solvency over an infinite
period, which generates a large sustainability index where, as here, fixed-policy projections
generate very high future debt ratios. Furthermore, the assumption that beyond the pro-
jection period the fiscal balance (as a ratio to GDP) remains constant is also very strong.
An alternative approach is to return to the debt equation (7) and consider a diﬀerent
question. Suppose it is required to reach a given debt target by a specified date, say  .
In the case (again a useful approximation for present purposes) where interest and growth
rates are constant, modification of (7) gives the projected debt at  of:
 = 0 (1 + ) +
−1X
=0
(− −−) (1 + ) (B.11)
Converting to debt and fiscal balance ratios gives:
0 = 00 (1 + 0) −
−1X
=0
− (1 + 0) (B.12)
where, as before,  = ( −) , and 0 = . The annual addition to the fiscal
balance, say ∗ , as a ratio of GDP, needed to achieve a debt target of, say 0∗ , rather than
0 , is given by the solution to:
0∗ = 00 (1 + 0) −
−1X
=0
(− +∗ ) (1 + 0) (B.13)
Using
P−1
=0 (1 + 0) =
n
(1 + 0) − 1
o
0, the required ∗ is given by:26
∗ =
½ 0
(1 + 0) − 1
¾(
00 (1 + 0) −0∗ −
−1X
=0
− (1 + 0)
)
(B.14)
26In European Commission, this is decomposed further as above using ∆ =  −0.
35
The value of ∗ gives an indication of the extent to which government expenditure or
tax revenue, or a combination of both, must be adjusted each year in order to attain the
debt target ratio, 0∗ , in the final projection year.
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